Recent Developments Involving Cedell v. Farmers Insurance Company of Washington

Ever since the Washington Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in Cedell v. Farmers Insurance Company of Washington, 176 Wn.2d 686, 295 P.3d 239 (2013), insurance coverage attorneys have been struggling to define the exact parameters of the Cedell ruling in order to safeguard the attorney-client privilege as to the communications between the insurer and its counsel.  As a brief background, the Washington Supreme Court held in Cedell that there is a presumption of no attorney-client privilege in a lawsuit involving bad faith claims handling.  However, an insurer can overcome the presumption of no attorney-client privilege by showing that its counsel provided legal advice regarding the insurer’s potential liability under the policy and law, and did not engage in any quasi-fiduciary activities, i.e. claims handling activities, such as investigating, evaluating, adjusting or processing the insured’s claim.

Since Cedell, various trial courts have held that the following activities by an insurer’s counsel constitute quasi-fiduciary conduct that do not overcome the presumption of no attorney-client privilege, resulting in an order to produce documents and/or to permit the deposition of the insurer’s counsel:

  • Insurer’s attorney being the primary or sole point of contact with the insured for the insurer;
  • Insurer’s attorney requesting documents from the insured that are relevant to the investigation of the claim;
  • Insurer’s attorney communicating directly with the insured or the insured’s counsel regarding claims handling issues or payments;
  • Insurer’s attorney interviewing witnesses for purposes of the investigation of the claim;
  • Insurer’s attorney conducting an examination under oath of the insured;
  • Insurer’s attorney drafting proposed or final reservation of rights letter or denial letter to the insured; and
  • Insurer’s attorney conducting settlement negotiations in an underlying litigation.

Conversely, some trial courts have held that the following activities by an insurer’s counsel are not quasi-fiduciary activities, in that insurer’s counsel is providing legal advice and opinion, resulting in a valid assertion of the attorney-client privilege:

  • Insurer’s attorney drafting a coverage opinion on the insurer’s own potential liability, such as whether or not the insured is entitled to coverage under the policy and law;
  • Insurer’s attorney drafting a response to an insured’s Insurance Fair Conduct Act (“IFCA”) Notice.

With respect to drafting a response to an insured’s IFCA Notice, however, there are cases that have held that such an activity is a quasi-fiduciary one, to the extent the insurer’s counsel was also involved in claims-handling activities, such as drafting a proposed denial letter and/or coverage position/Reservation of Rights letter to the insured. 

Recently, in Young v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 2022 WL 1404650 (W.D. Wash. May 4, 2022), the Western District Court of Washington provided additional clarification on what qualifies as a quasi-fiduciary activity in terms of an IFCA Notice response drafted by insurer’s counsel.  In Young, the insured made a claim to Safeco under a Landlord Protection Policy as a result of the tenant, who was found deceased in the insured’s rental property, making modifications to the property without the insured’s permission.  The insured sought coverage for renovations due to the tenant’s vandalism and for biohazard damage from the decomposition of the deceased tenant’s body.  Safeco initially denied coverage.  Subsequently, however, in the IFCA Notice response, Safeco’s coverage counsel advised the insured’s counsel that Safeco would like “to cure” its breach by accepting coverage, that the two losses appeared to be “two separate claims”, that Safeco would “set up a second claim to address the renovations[,]” and asked the insured to provide an estimate to repair the renovations to the rental property at issue.  Id. at *3.  The Court further noted that the insurer’s coverage counsel wrote to insured’s counsel to dispute whether the estimate provided by the insured included damage to the rental property not covered by the policy, outlined the coverage and exclusions contained in that policy (similar to what would be in a Reservation of Rights letter or coverage position letter sent to the insured), and requested a second inspection of the rental property, none of which pertained to the provision of legal advice or counsel to the insurer.  Id.  Rather, the Court characterized such tasks as the insurer’s renewed attempts to evaluate and process the insured’s vandalism claim.  Id.  The Court ordered the production of documents that had originally been redacted as attorney-client privilege.

In light of the Young case, it appears that an IFCA Notice response drafted by insurer’s counsel should not include anything that could be construed as pertaining to claims-handling, i.e. a reversal of coverage position and a request for additional information related to a claim.  Moreover, it is recommended that any communications with the insured about the claim, i.e. a dispute the insured’s estimate including non-covered damage or to request an inspection, should be done by the adjuster, not the insurer’s counsel, in order to protect the attorney-client privilege as to the communications between the insurer and its counsel.

Another recent case that deserves attention is Water’s Edge, A Condominium Owners Association v. Affiliated FM Insurance Company, 2022 WL 3054209 (W.D. Wash. August 2, 2022).  In Water’s Edge, the Federal District Court for the Western District of Washington ordered the deposition of the insurer’s counsel as the Court found that the counsel had engaged in claims processing and handling (quasi-fiduciary) tasks by reviewing, on behalf of the insurer, the documents that Water’s Edge submitted to the insurer in support of its claim; participating in the investigation into the nature and extent of the property damage; and drafting the denial letter on behalf of the insurer. Id. at *3.  The deposition of insurer’s counsel was limited to those three categories. 

At first glance, this decision seems to indicate that reviewing materials submitted by the insured would qualify as a quasi-fiduciary task.  However, we believe that context is important in this regard – in Water’s Edge, the documents were reviewed presumably to draft the denial letter, which has already been established as a quasi-fiduciary activity.  As a result, to the extent the insurer’s counsel is reviewing insured’s documents in order to draft anything other than a coverage opinion that outlines and evaluates the insurer’s potential legal liability under the policy, then such activity could presumably be deemed as claims-handling.  If insurer’s counsel is reviewing the insured’s documents for purposes of coverage assessment and drafting a coverage opinion, such conduct and all documents related to that conduct would be protected by the attorney-client privilege. 

There is some ambiguity in the Water’s Edge decision with respect to the Court’s identification of insurer’s counsel’s participation in the investigation into the nature and extent of the damage as a quasi-fiduciary task.  Generally, an analysis of the “nature” of damage is conducted in order to assess coverage under the policy, i.e. is the damage covered property damage or precluded under an exclusion?  An analysis of the “extent” of damage, though, would presumably involve some aspect of claims handling in that it generally addresses the repair costs of damage.  We can only hope that other decisions will eventually shed some light on the issue of “nature” versus “extent” of damage.

This area of the law is ever-evolving and complex.  If you have questions about the implications of Cedell or any of the cases discussed herein, or have any general questions in regard to pending insurance claims and compliance with Washington insurance law, please feel free to contact our office.

New Washington Regulation Requires Mandatory Language in an Insurer’s Denial Letter

The Washington State Office of the Insurance Commissioner (the “OIC”) has issued a new regulation, WAC 284-30-770, which mandates that insurers include specific advisory language in “adverse notifications” sent to insureds. Beginning on August 1, 2020, insurers will be required to include the mandatory language in any notice, statement, or document, wherein the insurer denies a claim, issues final payment for less than the amount of the claim submitted, makes an adverse benefit determination, or rescinds, terminates, cancels, or does not renew a policy. In any such notice, the insurer must include the following language:

“If you have questions or concerns about the actions of your insurance company or agent, or would like information on your rights to file an appeal, contact the Washington state Office of the Insurance Commissioner’s consumer protection hotline at 1-800-562-6900 or visit www.insurance.wa.gov. The insurance commissioner protects and educates insurance consumers, advances the public interest, and provides fair and efficient regulation of the insurance industry.”

This language must appear on either the first page or at the end of the adverse notification, and must be in the same font and font size as used in the majority of the notification. The OIC has advised that the purpose of the new rule is to “increase consumer awareness of available agency assistance and to help consumers with their insurance questions by requiring contact information for the Office of the Insurance Commissioner on adverse notifications.”

Many insurers already include similar language in claims correspondences sent to insureds in states other than Washington. Please be advised that beginning on August 1, 2020, insurers will also be required to include the above-stated language in certain adverse correspondences regarding insurance matters in Washington.

To the extent you have questions regarding this new regulation or another insurance-related issue, please do not hesitate to contact the insurance coverage team at Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, LLP.

Insurance Adjuster Employed by an Insurance Company May Be Liable for Bad Faith in Washington

As a general proposition, an adjuster working for an insurance company is not subject to personal liability under the common law or under state insurance laws for conduct within the scope of his/her employment. Recently, however, the Washington Court of Appeals, Division One, in Keodalah v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2018 Wash. App. LEXIS 685 (2018), held that an individual adjuster, employed by an insurance company, may be held liable for bad faith and violation of the Washington Consumer Protection Act (“CPA”).

In Keodalah, Moun Keodalah (“Keodalah”) was involved in an accident with a motorcycle, after which Keodalah sought uninsured/underinsured motorist (“UIM”) benefits of $25,000 under his auto policy issued by Allstate. Allstate offered $1,600 based on an assessment that Keodalah was 70 percent at fault, even though the Seattle Police Department and the accident reconstruction firm hired by Allstate concluded that the accident was caused by the excessive speed of the motorcyclist. When Keodalah questioned Allstate’s evaluation, Allstate increased its offer to $5,000. Thereafter, Keodalah sued Allstate for UIM benefits.  Despite having the police investigation report, its own accident reconstruction firm’s findings, and the 30(b)(6) deposition testimony of the Allstate adjuster, who acknowledged that Keodalah had not run a stop sign and had not been on his cell phone at the time of the accident, Allstate maintained its position that Keodalah was 70 percent at fault. At trial, the jury determined that the motorcyclist was 100 percent at fault and awarded Keodalah $108,868.20 for his injuries, lost wages, and medical expenses.

Keodalah then filed a second lawsuit against Allstate and the adjuster, including claims under the Insurance Fair Conduct Act (“IFCA”), the CPA, as well as for insurance bad faith. The adjuster moved to dismiss the claims against her under Rule 12(b)(6). The trial court granted the motion but certified the case for discretionary review. First, the court held that there was no private cause of action for violation of a regulation under the IFCA, following the recent Washington Supreme Court decision in Perez-Cristantos v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 187 Wn.2d 669 (2017).

The Court of Appeals then addressed whether an individual insurance adjuster may be liable for bad faith and for violation of the CPA. The court looked to the Revised Code of Washington (“RCW”) 48.01.030, which serves as the basis for the tort of bad faith. RCW 48.01.030 imposes a duty of good faith on “all persons” involved in insurance, including the insurer and its representatives, and a breach of such duty renders a person liable for the tort of bad faith. The term “person” is defined as “any individual, company, insurer, association, organization, reciprocal or interinsurance exchange, partnership, business trust, or corporation.” RCW 48.01.070.  Because the adjuster was engaged in the business of insurance and was acting as an Allstate representative, she had the duty to act in good faith under the plain language of the statute. As a result, the Court of Appeals held that the adjuster can be sued for bad faith.

With respect to the CPA claim, the court noted that the CPA prohibits “[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.” RCW 19.86.020. The Court of Appeals, Division One, previously ruled that under “settled law,” the “CPA does not contemplate suits against employees of insurers.” International Ultimate, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 122 Wn. App. 736, 87 P.3d 774 (Wash. App. 2004). There, the court held that to be liable under the CPA, there must be a contractual relationship between the parties and because there is no such relationship between an employee of the insurer and the insured, the employee cannot be liable for a CPA violation. The court in Keodalah, however, rejected the adjuster’s reliance on International Ultimate, holding that the prior decision was without any supporting authority, and it was inconsistent and irreconcilable with the Washington Supreme Court case of Panag v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., 166 Wn.2d 27, 208 P.3d 885 (2009) (Washington Supreme Court declined to add a sixth element to the Hangman Ridge elements that would require proof of a consumer transaction between the parties). It appears that the holding in International Ultimate may be losing ground, as at least two federal district court cases have questioned the validity of that case. Lease Crutcher Lewis WA, LLC v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97899, *15 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 20, 2009), (statement at issue in International Ultimate “is unsupported by any citation or analysis); Zuniga v. Std. Guar. Ins. Co., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79821, *5-6 (W.D. Wash. May 24, 2017) (pointing out at least two problems with the statement at issue in International Ultimate).

While the adjuster’s actions in Keodalah appear to have been extreme, presumably policyholders in Washington will rely on this case to sue an insurance company’s adjusters in their individual capacities for bad faith and CPA violations. The court’s holding may have far reaching consequences. For example, will insurers need to appoint separate counsel for their adjusters when the adjusters are personally named in litigation? How will this affect the practice of removing cases from state to federal court? To the extent an insured wants to destroy diversity jurisdiction for its out-of-state insurer, it may choose to name an in-state adjuster, which would limit the insurer to Washington State Court when litigating coverage issues. This is an extremely alarming development for insurers and their employee adjusters in Washington State, who should take this as a reminder to be vigilant in ensuring good faith claims handling and the aggressive defense of bad faith claims.

Insurance Coverage for Wrongful Incarceration Claims in Ohio

Over the past 18 months, we have examined numerous states’ approaches to insurance coverage for underlying claims of wrongful incarceration and malicious prosecution. See here, here, here and here.

Last summer, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, interpreting Ohio law, weighed in on this issue. Selective Ins. Co. v. RLI Ins. Co., 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 16327 (6th Cir. Aug. 24, 2017). The Sixth Circuit ruled that the district court erred in finding an excess insurer liable for a settlement of an underlying malicious prosecution claim arising out of a claimant’s wrongful conviction. The court concluded that coverage was not triggered because the claim did not occur until several months after the policy period expired, when police withheld new exculpatory evidence from the wrongfully convicted claimant and there was no longer probable cause for the claimant’s arrest and prosecution.

In Selective, “Insurer A” issued an excess policy to the City of Barberton (“City”) from June 29, 1997 to June 29, 1998, and “Insurer B” issued an excess policy to the City from June 29, 1998 to June 29, 1999. The underlying claimant, who was exonerated of rape and murder based on DNA evidence after spending several years in jail, sued the City and its police officers, alleging violations of state law and his federal constitutional rights. All claims against the City were dismissed. The surviving claims against the individual officers included a § 1983 claim for a violation of due process based on the officers’ failure to disclose exculpatory evidence, and state law claims of malicious prosecution and loss of consortium. Specifically, the failure to disclose exculpatory evidence, i.e., the Brady violation, involved an inter-departmental memorandum that a police officer drafted identifying a suspect in two other aggravated robberies as the likely suspect in the claimant’s rape and murder case. The civil case settled for $5.25 million, to which Insurer B contributed $3.25 million. Insurer A denied coverage, claiming that the malicious prosecution of the claimant did not “occur” during its policy period.

As part of the settlement, Insurer B took an assignment of rights from the insured and filed suit against Insurer A for a declaration of coverage under Insurer A’s policy. Insurer B argued on summary judgment that the malicious prosecution of the claimant “occurred” when the charges were filed against the claimant on June 11, 1998. As a result, coverage was triggered under Insurer A’s policy, whose policy period ended on June 29, 1998. Insurer A also moved for summary judgment, arguing that the tort of malicious prosecution occurred at the time of the Brady violation, which occurred in January 1999, six months after its policy expired.

The district court disagreed with Insurer A, stating that although the January 1999 concealment of exculpatory evidence was enough on its own for the claimant’s malicious prosecution claim, there was also evidence of wrongdoing by the police officers during the earlier policy period, such as the dismissal of alibi witnesses and a DNA mismatch. Therefore, the claimant may have had a viable malicious prosecution claim even prior to the alleged Brady violation, during the first policy period. The district court then relied on what it called the “majority rule” from other jurisdictions as to trigger of coverage for malicious prosecution claims, holding that coverage for such claims is triggered at the time that the underlying charges are filed. Because the claimant was first arrested during the first policy period, the court ruled that Insurer A owed coverage and had to reimburse Insurer B.

On appeal to the Sixth Circuit, Insurer A again argued that it was not liable for the excess liability claim because no tort occurred during the policy. The Sixth Circuit agreed, concluding that the district court erred in finding Insurer A liable for the settlement. According to the court, because there was probable cause to prosecute and detain the claimant until exculpatory evidence came into existence, the officers’ actions before the exculpatory evidence came into existence could not have caused a covered loss under the RLI policy. The court explained that under Ohio law, malicious prosecution requires the instituting or continuing of prosecution without probable cause. In Ohio, a claimant can recover for a prosecution that was not malicious at its inception, but became malicious later, when it continued without probable cause. The key issue is whether there was probable cause and when such probable cause disappeared. The court determined that in the underlying matter, the City and police officers had probable cause until the alleged Brady violation, such that the malicious prosecution and the deprivation of due process could only have occurred in January 1999, after expiration of Insurer A’s policy period. Therefore, the court concluded that under the plain language of the policy, the police officers’ liability to claimant was not covered under Insurer A’s policy.

The Sixth Circuit distinguished the district court’s “majority rule” based upon the policy language at issue in Insurer A’s policy and because none of the cases relied upon dealt with a situation like claimant’s case, “where the injury—i.e., the filing of charges—occurred before any tortious activity, and therefore could not have been caused by the tortious activity.”

This case demonstrates the importance of carefully analyzing the specific elements of a malicious prosecution claim in a particular jurisdiction, as well as the specific policy language at issue. Such careful analysis translates to a predictable conclusion in trigger of coverage for wrongful incarceration cases.

The next installment will review the law in Mississippi. In the meantime, if there are any questions about other jurisdictions or jurisdictions already discussed, please contact us (sries@grsm.com or sallykim@grsm.com) and we can address your questions directly.

Insurance Coverage for Malicious Prosecution Claims in Georgia

Until recently, Georgia has had no case law addressing insurance coverage trigger for a malicious prosecution claim. But in 2016, the Georgia Court of Appeals finally rendered an opinion addressing this specific issue, with a twist in that the claimant was arrested during the policy period but was charged and prosecuted after the policy expired.

In Zook v. Arch Specialty Ins. Co., 784 S.E.2d 119 (2016), the claimant was arrested on May 21, 2009 after an incident at the insured’s nightclub. The claimant was charged with simple battery on March 1, 2010 and was prosecuted thereafter. After the jury found the claimant not guilty of simple battery, he commenced a lawsuit against the nightclub and its employees for false imprisonment, battery, negligence, malicious prosecution and malicious arrest. While that action was pending, the claimant filed a declaratory judgment action against the same defendants and Arch Specialty Insurance Company (“Arch”), which issued a CGL policy (“Policy”) to the nightclub from June 27, 2008 to June 27, 2009. The policy provided coverage for injury arising out of malicious prosecution if the offense was committed during the policy period. Arch took the position that the “offense” took place on March 1, 2010, when the claimant was charged with the crime for which he was prosecuted (simple battery). Because the Policy expired on June 27, 2009, Arch argued that no offense took place during the policy period.  The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment to Arch.

The Georgia Court of Appeals, however, disagreed. The Court noted that Georgia appellate courts had not yet addressed the issue of when a malicious prosecution claim arises for purposes of triggering insurance coverage. The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the majority of other jurisdictions have held that “coverage is triggered when the insured sets in motion the legal machinery of the state.” Id. at 674. However, the Court disagreed with Arch’s interpretation of the majority holding because Arch focused on when the claimant was charged and relied on case law that dealt with a scenario in which the claimant was arrested and charged on the same date.

The Georgia Court of Appeals held that in this case, the arrest is the “bad act” of the insured that set the legal machinery of the state in action.  Id. at 675. In other words, the arrest was the “offense” that invoked the judicial process against the claimant, and the arrest took place during the Arch policy period. The Court held,

From the standpoint of a reasonable person in the position of the insured, policy coverage for injury arising from a malicious prosecution occurring during the policy period exists if the insured’s conduct in instituting such a prosecution took place during the covered period. For the foregoing reasons, we adopt the majority rule that when the contract does not specify, insurance coverage is triggered on a potential claim for malicious prosecution when the insured sets in motion the legal machinery of the state.

Id. at 675-6.

The analysis pertaining to the trigger of coverage for wrongful incarceration and malicious prosecution cases are becoming more intricate and detail-oriented as the courts throughout the country are exposed to different fact patterns. To the extent that the claimant is arrested and charged during different policy periods, it appears that the first event of the arrest will be considered as the event that triggers coverage.

The next installment will review the law in Ohio. In the meantime, if there are any questions about other jurisdictions or jurisdictions already discussed, please contact us (sallykim@grsm.com or sries@grsm.com) and we can address your questions directly.

Washington Supreme Court Denies Reconsideration of Its Decision to Apply the Efficient Proximate Cause Rule to a Third-Party Liability Policy

We previously reported the Washington Supreme Court’s decision in Xia, et al. v. ProBuilders Specialty Insurance Company, et al., 188 Wn.2d 171, 393 P.3d 748 (2017), in which the Court applied the efficient proximate cause rule to a third-party liability policy to find a duty to defend.

To recap, Washington law requires insurers to assess and investigate coverage under first-party insurance policies by applying the efficient proximate cause analysis. Until Xia, the efficient proximate cause rule has only been applied to first party insurance policies in Washington. But the Washington Supreme Court’s decision in Xia changed that by holding that an insurer must consider the efficient proximate cause rule in determining its duty to defend under a CGL policy.

The issue in Xia was whether the pollution exclusion applied to relieve ProBuilders of its duty to defend a claim against the insured alleging that carbon monoxide was released into the claimant’s house through a defectively installed vent. ProBuilders denied coverage to the insured contractor, in part, under the pollution exclusion. The Washington Supreme Court held that while ProBuilders did not err in determining that the plain language of its pollution exclusion applied to the release of carbon monoxide into Xia’s home, “under the ‘eight corners rule’ of reviewing the complaint and the insurance policy, ProBuilders should have noted that a potential issue of efficient proximate cause existed,” as Xia alleged negligence in her original complaint, i.e. failure to properly install venting for the hot water heater and failure to properly discover the disconnected venting.

Ultimately, the Court concluded that the efficient proximate cause of the claimant’s loss was a covered peril – the negligent installation of a hot water heater. Even though ProBuilders correctly applied the language of its pollution exclusion to the release of carbon monoxide into the house, the Court ruled that ProBuilders breached its duty to defend as it failed to consider an alleged covered occurrence that was the efficient proximate cause of the loss. The Court granted judgment as a matter of law to the claimant with regard to her breach of contract and bad faith claims.

Soon after the Washington Supreme Court’s decision, ProBuilders filed a motion asking the Court to reconsider its decision. However, on August 17, 2017, the Washington Supreme Court denied the motion, leaving in place the holding that insurers must take the efficient proximate cause rule when analyzing coverage under third-party policies.

As discussed in our earlier post, the efficient proximate cause rule applies “when two or more perils combine in sequence to cause a loss and a covered peril is the predominant or efficient cause of the loss.” Vision One, LLC v. Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Co., 174 Wn.2d 501, 276 P.3d 300 (2012). “If the initial event, the ‘efficient proximate cause,’ is a covered peril, then there is coverage under the policy regardless of whether subsequent events within the chain, which may be causes-in-fact of the loss, are excluded by the policy.” Key Tronic Corp., Inc. v. Aetna (CIGNA) Fire Underwriters Insurance Co., 124 Wn.2d 618, 881 P.2d 210 (1994).

Insurers must be extremely cautious when assessing the duty to defend and an exclusion that could potentially preclude coverage. Under Xia, liability insurers must examine the underlying complaint very carefully to determine whether there could potentially be multiple causes of a loss, and if so, which cause is the initiating cause. If the initiating cause is potentially a covered event, then there may be coverage and the insurer must provide a defense under reservation of rights in order to minimize bad faith exposure.

If you would like more information on the efficient proximate cause rule in Washington, please feel free to contact Sally S. Kim (sallykim@grsm.com or 206-695-5147) or Stephanie Ries (sries@grsm.com or 206-695-5123).

Insurance Coverage for Wrongful Incarceration Cases in New Jersey

The third jurisdiction we address pertaining to wrongful incarceration coverage issues is New Jersey, which has three relevant cases. New Jersey courts have held that for purposes of determining the existence of insurance coverage under a general liability policy, in the absence of any applicable exclusion, the triggering event occurs on the date when the underlying criminal complaint is filed against the claimant. However, when determining coverage for a municipal insured’s obligation to indemnify its employee for fees incurred in defending against criminal charges, as required by specific statutes, the triggering event is not the filing of criminal charges against the employee, but rather the acquittal or dismissal of those charges against the employee.

The first of the malicious prosecution cases is Muller Fuel Oil Co. v. Ins. Co. of North America, 232 A.2d 168 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1967), in which the insured, Muller Fuel Oil Company (“Muller”), unsuccessfully filed a criminal complaint against Thomas Policastro (“Policastro”) for issuing a worthless check. Policastro was arrested in November 1961 and indicted in May 1962.  In December 1962, Muller purchased a CGL policy from Insurance Company of North America (“INA”). Thereafter, in March 1963, Policastro was acquitted of the criminal charges and quickly filed a malicious prosecution and false arrest suit against Muller.

Muller sought coverage from INA, claiming that Policastro’s lawsuit against it did not fully ripen until his acquittal in March 1963, and thus constituted an “occurrence” during INA’s policy period of December 1, 1962 to December 1, 1965. INA, on the other hand, denied coverage for Muller’s claim, contending that the criminal complaint that was the basis for Policastro’s malicious prosecution suit was filed by Muller prior to inception of the INA policy. Muller then sought a declaratory judgment that coverage existed under the policy.

On appeal from a New Jersey Superior Court ruling dismissing Muller’s complaint against INA, the Appellate Division affirmed the decision, finding that “[i]n a claim based on malicious prosecution the damage begins to flow from the very commencement of the tortious conduct – the making of the criminal complaint.” According to the Appellate Division, the allegedly tortious conduct and injury to the accused as a result of the malicious prosecution (arrest on November 1961) antedated the issuance of the policy (December 1, 1962) by more than year. As a result, there was no coverage under the INA policy.

The second malicious prosecution case is Paterson Tallow Co. v. Royal Globe Ins. Co. 89 N.J. 24, 444 A.2d 579 (1981). In Paterson, the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court that insurer Royal Globe Insurance Company (“Royal Globe”) was not obligated to defend the insured, Paterson Tallow Company (“Paterson”), because the complaint that resulted in the malicious prosecution action against Paterson was filed before the effective date of Royal Globe’s policy.

In Paterson, Paterson filed criminal charges in June 1969 against a former employee, James Brown (“Brown”), for theft. In October 1970, while the criminal charges were pending, Paterson purchased a CGL policy that provided coverage for bodily injury, property damage, and personal injury, including coverage for malicious prosecution. In March 1971, Brown was acquitted of all charges against him. Brown filed suit against Paterson in January 1977 alleging malicious prosecution, and Paterson tendered the claim to Royal Globe seeking coverage. Royal Globe denied coverage for the claim, in part, because “all the acts that were alleged to constitute malicious prosecution took place before the policy was issued in 1970.” In a subsequent declaratory judgment action, Paterson and Royal filed cross motions for summary judgment and Paterson asserted that it was entitled to coverage for the action because a crucial component of the malicious prosecution offense, specifically, termination of the criminal charges against Brown, occurred during Royal Globe’s policy period.

The trial court found the appellate court’s ruling in Muller (discussed above) dispositive and granted summary judgment in favor of Royal Globe. On appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that “for the purpose of determining the existence of coverage under this type of policy, in the absence of any qualifying exclusion or exception the offense of malicious prosecution occurs on the date when the underlying [criminal] complaint is filed. Inasmuch as the [criminal complaint] in this case was filed before the effective date of the policy, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division denying coverage.”

The third case is slightly different in that it addressed coverage for an insured’s obligation to indemnify its employee for fees and costs the employee incurred defending against criminal charges against him that were ultimately found to be meritless. In Board of Education v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 798 A.2d 605 (N.J. 2002), the New Jersey Supreme Court was tasked with deciding whether it was the filing of criminal charges against an employee of a board of education, or the acquittal of dismissal of those charges, that triggered coverage under an insurance policy issued to satisfy the board’s statutory obligation to indemnify such employee. The trial court found that the triggering event was the acquittal or dismissal while the appellate court reversed and decided that the triggering event was the filing of criminal charges. On appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the triggering event is the acquittal or other disposition of the criminal charges in favor of the employee of the board of education.

This case involved a teacher, David Ford (“Ford”), employed by the Borough of Florham Park Board of Education (“Board”), who was arrested and charged with sexual assault and reckless endangerment of four of his students in June 1996. In March 1999, a jury acquitted Ford of all charges. Soon after, he demanded that the Board reimburse him nearly $500,000 in legal fees and expenses for successfully defending the criminal action pursuant to various New Jersey statutes that “…obligate a board of education to defray all costs incurred by an … employee of the board in defending criminal charges filed against the person whose charges: … (2) resulted in a final disposition in favor of such person.” The statute also authorized a board to purchase insurance to cover all such damages, losses and expenses the board may be obligated to pay.

The Board sought coverage from Selective Insurance Company (“Selective”) and Utica Mutual Insurance Company (“Utica”) for its indemnity obligation to Ford. At the time of Ford’s arrest, the Board was insured by Selective under a policy that provided coverage from July 1, 1993 to July 1, 1996. By endorsement, the Selective policy provided that “this Coverage Part shall conform to the terms of the New Jersey compiled statutes” discussed above. Utica insured the Board from July 1, 1996 to July 1, 1999, and contained a nearly identical endorsement provision as the Selective policy, incorporating the pertinent New Jersey statutes. Utica denied coverage to the Board because its policy was not in effect when Ford was criminally charged in June 1996. Selective denied coverage for any legal expenses that were incurred after its policy expired on July 1, 1996, and reserved the right to deny all coverage. The Board filed a declaratory judgment action against Selective and Utica.

The trigger issue was appealed to the New Jersey Supreme Court. The Court noted that both the Selective and Utica policies incorporated by reference the statutory language, which specified that an employee’s right to reimbursement accrues when “the criminal charges result in an acquittal or otherwise are dismissed.” The Court also noted that indemnification obligations generally accrue “only on an event fixing liability, rather than on preliminary events that eventually may lead to liability but have not yet occurred.” The Court held that the triggering event for coverage was the favorable disposition of all criminal charges against Ford. As a result, Utica’s policy was triggered since Ford incurred no reimbursable expenses prior to his acquittal. On the other hand, Selective had no coverage obligation as the Selective policy had expired by the time of Ford’s acquittal.

The Court distinguished its holding in Paterson and explained that when an insured seeks coverage related to its own conduct of initiating criminal charges against its employee, it is reasonable to use the conduct of the insured in filing the criminal charges as the “triggering event” to assess coverage for malicious prosecution. But in a statutory indemnification case, the “essence” of the claim is not the filing of the criminal charges.” Rather, the Board’s liability “is triggered by the event specified in the statutes, namely a final disposition of those charges in favor of the Board’s employee.”

In light of the cases discussed above, the New Jersey courts are fairly clear that the trigger of coverage in malicious prosecution and wrongful arrest cases is the filing of charges against the claimant. However, in cases involving coverage for statutory indemnification of fees and costs incurred in defending against a criminal prosecution case, the trigger of coverage is not filing of charges, but rather, acquittal of such charges. As is always the case, it is important to carefully review the applicable policy and understand the scope of coverage provided.

The next installment will review the law in Georgia. In the meantime, if there are any questions about another jurisdiction, please contact us (sallykim@gordonrees.com or sries@gordonrees.com) and we can address your questions directly.

Insurance Coverage for Wrongful Incarceration Cases in California

The second jurisdiction we will discuss pertaining to coverage issues arising out of claims for wrongful incarceration is California, which, like New York, has two pertinent decisions involving coverage for malicious prosecution cases. Unlike New York, however, the case law in California stems from civil cases, not criminal cases. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeal in California held that it makes no difference whether the case is civil or criminal in determining whether a claim for malicious prosecution implicates insurance coverage.

The first case is Harbor Insurance Company v. Central National Insurance Company, 165 Cal. App.3d 1029, 211 Cal. Rptr. 902 (1985), in which the insured, A.J. Industries, Inc. (“A.J.”) unsuccessfully prosecuted an action between 1971 and 1978 against its former president and chairman. When A.J. filed the action, it was insured by Zurich Insurance Company (“Zurich”) for a limit of $300,000 and by Harbor Insurance Company (“Harbor”) for $5,000,000. While the malicious action was pending (and until April 1, 1975), A.J. switched insurers and had primary insurance with Argonaut Insurance Company (“Argonaut”) and excess insurance with Midland Insurance Company (“Midland”).

On April 16, 1976, the former president and chairman filed an action against A.J. for malicious prosecution. By that point in time, A.J. was insured by Central National Insurance Company (“Central National”). A.J. nonetheless tendered its defense to Zurich.  Zurich accepted the tender and turned the matter for handling to Harbor, the concurrent excess carrier. Harbor defended the malicious prosecution action under reservation of rights, and also tendered the claim to Central National, Midland and Argonaut. After those insurers denied coverage, Harbor filed suit.

The issue addressed by the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, was whether Argonaut’s or Midland’s policies provided coverage for the malicious prosecution lawsuit against A.J.

Argonaut’s policy provided coverage for damages because of “personal injury” sustained by any person arising out of an offense committed in the conduct of the named insured’s business.  The term “offense” included false arrest, detention or imprisonment, or malicious prosecution, if such offense is committed during the policy period. The Court of Appeal ruled that the “offense” of malicious prosecution is “committed” upon institution of the malicious action against the defendant. The court noted that the “gist of the tort is committed when the malicious action is commenced and the defendant is subjected to process or other injurious impact by the action.” In other words, “from both the tortfeasor’s and the victim’s standpoint the ‘offense’ is ‘committed’ upon initial prosecution of that action. At that point the tortfeasor has invoked the judicial process against the victim maliciously and without probable cause, and the victim has thereby suffered damage.” Because the malicious action was commenced before the Argonaut policy came into effect, the court held that there was no coverage under the policy.

The court rejected Harbor’s argument that the offense of malicious prosecution is a “continuing occurrence,” which is “committed” throughout the prosecution of the malicious action because it continues to cause damage until the action is terminated. The Court of Appeal noted that such an argument was a theoretical misunderstanding of the elements of the tort in that “[a]lthough continued proceedings after commencement of the action will increase and aggravate the defendant’s damages, the initial wrong and consequent harm have been committed upon commencement of the action and the initial impact thereof on the defendant.”

The Court then addressed the two Midland policies, one of which agreed to indemnify A.J. against such ultimate net loss in excess of the primary limits by reason of liability for damages because of personal injury caused by an occurrence. This excess policy defined “personal injury” as “injury arising out of false arrest, false imprisonment, wrongful eviction, detention, malicious prosecution, … which occurs during the policy period.” The Court of Appeal held that the definition of “personal injury” required the malicious prosecution to “occur” during the policy period. For the reasons discussed pertaining to the Argonaut policy, the Court of Appeal held that malicious prosecution did not “occur” during this Midland policy, so Midland had no obligations under the policy.

The second Midland policy agreed to indemnify A.J. for all sums that it became obligated to pay by reason of liability for damages on account of “personal injuries” caused by an “occurrence.” The term “personal injuries” was defined, in part, as malicious prosecution, and the term “occurrence” was defined as “an accident, including injurious exposure to conditions, which results, during the policy period, in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the Insured.” In order to avoid a self-defeating construction of the policy that would render “personal injuries” being excluded from coverage, the court deemed as an oversight the use of the term “bodily injury” in the definition of “occurrence” and inserted “personal injuries” in the place of “bodily injury” in the definition.

So construed, however, the policy yet remains limited in coverage to “occurrences” which result in personal injury (here, i.e., malicious prosecution), or property damage, within the policy period. The upshot of this “occurrence” limitation is that the instant incident of malicious prosecution was not subject to this policy. As discussed above, A.J.’s malicious prosecution “occurred” before the policy term began, when the malicious action was commenced against [the former president and chairman] in 1971. The gist of the wrong then was inflicted and complete.

The Court found no coverage under this Midland policy.

The second California case is Zurich Ins. Co. v. Peterson, 188 Cal. App.3d 438, 232 Cal. Rptr. 807 (1986), which involved a lawsuit filed by Tri-Tool against its president to rescind an employment contract. When the complaint was filed, Tri-Tool was insured by Home Insurance Company (“Home”). The Home policy agreed to indemnify Tri-Tool for damages because of injury arising out of the offenses of false arrest, detention, or imprisonment, or malicious prosecution, if such offense is committed during the policy period.

In February of 1980, the Home policy was replaced by a primary policy issued by American Guarantee and Liability Insurance Company (“AGLIC”) and an excess policy issued by Zurich Insurance Company (“Zurich”). The AGLIC policy agreed to pay all sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of “personal injury,” which, in turn, was defined as an “injury arising out of one or more of the following offenses committed during the policy period” and listed false arrest, detention, imprisonment or malicious prosecution as the offenses. The Zurich policy also provided coverage for personal injury, including “injury resulting from false arrest, detention or imprisonment, … malicious prosecution ….” The policy defined an “occurrence” of malicious prosecution as “an act or series of acts of the same or similar nature, committed during this policy period which causes such personal injury.”

The Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, noted that a favorable termination of the malicious action might be a prerequisite to the filing a malicious prosecution action, but it was not determinative of coverage because the policies at issue did not contain any reference to a particular date. Rather, to implicate coverage, the policies required the act or offense of malicious prosecution to have been committed during the policy period. The court then reviewed the Harbor Insurance Company case and noted that the Harbor court rejected the continuing occurrence concept and determined that the critical date was the filing of the complaint. The Court ruled,

It makes little difference whether the state or an individual controls the maliciously prosecuted action: an individual is first injured upon the filing of a complaint with malice and without probable cause. While some of the adverse consequences to the injured party will depend on whether a criminal prosecution is begun or a civil suit prosecuted, in each case a party’s reputation is injured and legal expenses are incurred at the initiation of the malicious complaint. The fact that damages increase as the prosecution continues does not transform malicious prosecution into a continuing occurrence. We join the reasoned decisions of the majority in holding that for purposes of an insurance policy which measures coverage by the period within which the “offense is committed,” the tort of malicious prosecution occurs upon the filing of the complaint.

Because the policies issued by Zurich and American came into effect after the date Tri-Tool filed its complaint against the president, neither insurer had an obligation to defend or indemnify Tri-Tool.

The interesting thing about California is the interplay between wrongful incarceration cases and California Insurance Code Section 533 (“Section 533”), which states, in part, that an “insurer is not liable for a loss caused by the willful act of the insured; but he is not exonerated by the negligence of the insured, or of the insured’s agents or others.” In short, Section 533 precludes insurance coverage, or indemnity, for a “willful act,” but Section 533 does not apply to the duty to defend or to vicarious liability.

In Downey Venture, et al. v. LMI Ins. Co., 66 Cal. App. 4th 478, 78 Cal. Rptr.2d 143 (1998), the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, held that Section 533 precluded coverage for malicious prosecution, even though such coverage was expressly provided in the policy, because malice is an element for establishing a claim for malicious prosecution. The Court of Appeal noted that in California, “the commission of the tort of malicious prosecution requires a showing of an unsuccessful prosecution of a criminal or civil action, which any reasonable attorney would regard as totally and completely without merit, for the intentionally wrongful purpose of injuring another person.” Id. at 154. The Court of Appeal ultimately held that because the commission of the tort of malicious prosecution constitutes a willful act within the meaning of Section 533, LMI was not obligated to indemnify the insured for such claim.

Ultimately, under California law, an insurer may have a defense obligation in wrongful incarceration cases, but there is a good chance that the insurer will not have an indemnity obligation to the extent that the liability of the insured(s) is based on “willful acts” of malicious prosecution.

The next installment will review the law in New Jersey, a jurisdiction that may have the oldest case law pertaining to insurance coverage for malicious prosecution cases. Again, if there are any questions about another jurisdiction, please contact us (sallykim@gordonrees.com or sries@gordonrees.com) and we can address your questions directly.

Insurance Coverage for Wrongful Incarceration Cases in New York

Over a decade has gone by since we first reported on an uptick in post-conviction exonerations due to advances in DNA testing, data preservation and electronic record-keeping that led to the discovery of exculpatory evidence. Today, insurance coverage lawsuits for wrongful incarceration cases are becoming more and more frequent. Typically, such cases involve a scenario in which the underlying claimant is arrested, tried and sentenced for a crime and then subsequently, the underlying claimant is either acquitted or released due to new evidence, lack of evidence or procedural mishaps in the initial trial. While more and more states are instituting statutory remedies for wrongful incarceration, the municipality and its law enforcement and prosecutorial entities are still sued for state tort claims and federal civil rights violations. The insured defendants, in turn, tender the matters to their carriers under general liability policies, errors and omissions policies and law enforcement liability policies.

This series of blog posts with discuss the law in various jurisdictions that have addressed coverage issues related to wrongful incarceration under different types of policies. The first jurisdiction we address is New York.

There are two pertinent New York cases that address coverage issues for claims of false arrest, false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. The first is National Cas. Ins. Co. v. City of Mount Vernon, 128 A.D.2d 332 (1987). In City of Mount Vernon, the underlying claimant was arrested in June 1981 and incarcerated until January 7, 1983. Thereafter, the underlying claimant commenced a lawsuit against the City of Mount Vernon (“City”) and the Mount Vernon Police Department to recover damages for, among other things, false arrest and false imprisonment.

National Casualty issued a policy to the City from January 1, 1983 to January 1, 1984, that provided coverage for all sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of “wrongful acts” which result in “personal injury” caused by an “occurrence.” The term “occurrence” was defined as an event, including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which results in “personal injury” during the policy period. The term “personal injury” was defined to include false arrest, detention or imprisonment, or malicious prosecution. Based on the above definitions, the National Casualty policy would be triggered by false arrest, detention or imprisonment during the policy period.

Upon tender, National Casualty denied coverage because the underlying claimant’s arrest in June 1981 occurred prior to the policy’s inception date of January 1, 1983. The Appellate Division disagreed:

Contrary to National’s contentions, the language of the occurrence clause herein ascribes no temporal relevance to the causative event preceding the covered injury, but rather premises coverage exclusively upon the sustaining of specified injuries during the policy period. Thus, the pertinent policy provision provides coverage for an “occurrence”, and thereafter, states that an occurrence “means an event … which results in PERSONAL INJURY … sustained, during the policy period” (emphasis supplied). Indeed, as one commentator has stated in discussing a similar provision, “[t]he policy will not depend upon the causative event of occurrence but will be based upon injuries or damages which result from such an event and which happened during the policy period. It will not be material whether the causative event happened during or before the policy period.” … Accordingly, the operative event triggering exposure, and thus resulting in coverage under the policy, is the sustaining of a specified injury during the policy period.

Id.at 336-337. The Appellate Division held that damage resulting from false imprisonment represented a category of covered personal injury, and that such damage was allegedly sustained, at least in part, when the policy was in force, i.e. from January 1, 1983 to January 7, 1983. As a result, the City was entitled to coverage under the National Casualty policy.

The second case is Town of Newfane v. General Star National Ins. Co., 14 A.D.3d 72, 784 N.Y.S.2d 787 (2004). Selective Insurance (“Selective”) issued a policy, effective April 26, 2000, that provided coverage for claims for damages because of “personal injury” caused by an offense arising out of the Town of Newfane’s business, but only if the offense was committed during the policy period. The term “personal injury” was defined, in part, as “injury, other than ‘bodily injury’ arising out of one or more of the following offenses: a. [f]alse arrest, detention or imprisonment; [or] b. [m]alicious prosecution.”

The underlying claimant alleged that he was “charged, arrested and jailed under a warrant” on June 7, 1989. He was again jailed for several hours on April 9, 1990. On June 6, 1990, he was convicted of 36 counts of violating Town Law and zoning ordinance. He was sentenced and remanded to jail on July 23, 1990. He was then discharged from custody later that day and the judgment of conviction was reversed on appeal on July 2, 1991, at which time all but one count was dismissed. The criminal prosecution on that one remaining count remained dormant until November 28, 2000, when his motion to dismiss for lack of speedy trial was granted.

The underlying claimant sued the Town of Newfane for malicious prosecution, false arrest, and false imprisonment, among other claims. Initially, the Appellate Division noted that the “offenses” of false imprisonment and false arrest were “committed” outside the Selective policy’s effective date of April 26, 2000. The only issue before the court was whether there was coverage for the malicious prosecution claim “where the criminal prosecution was initiated before the effective date of the policy but terminated in favor of the accused during the policy period.” The Appellate Division concluded, based on the language of the policy, that as a matter of law, there was no coverage for an underlying malicious prosecution cause of action because the date of the commencement of the underlying criminal prosecution was the controlling date for purposes of insurance coverage. The Appellate Division explained that

… the “offense” of malicious prosecution was “committed”, for purposes of determining the issue of insurance coverage, in 1989, more than a decade before the effective date of the Selective policy. That “offense was committed” when the prosecution was instituted, allegedly without probable cause. Such initiation of the criminal prosecution is the essence or gist of the tort of malicious prosecution. Moreover, the legal injury or “offense” incurred by the plaintiff in the underlying action (albeit not necessarily the damages incurred as a result of that “offense”) is the same irrespective of whether the criminal prosecution was known to be baseless when it was initiated or only subsequently demonstrated to be lacking in merit. Therefore, the injury to the accused was contemporaneous with the initiation of the criminal proceeding against him and hence complete long before the inception of coverage and the incidental termination of the criminal prosecution. We thus conclude that, for purposes of determining insurance coverage, malicious prosecution is not a continuing tort. We further conclude that the policy is to be construed as “fixing the point of coverage for malicious prosecution at one readily ascertainable date; the date on which the acts [we]re committed that [might] result in ultimate liability” or “when the alleged tortfeasor t[ook the] action resulting in the application of the [s]tate’s criminal process to the [plaintiff in the underlying action]”.….

Id. at 75-80 (internal citations omitted).

The Appellate Division acknowledged that a malicious prosecution claim may be premised on the initiation or continuation of a criminal proceeding without probable cause, and such claim does not accrue for purposes of the statute of limitations until the ultimate dismissal or favorable termination of the criminal charges. The Appellate Division further recognized that the damages incurred by reason of the continuation of a criminal prosecution might continue. Nevertheless, the court held that none of these considerations were determinative as the policy language focused on when the offense was committed, not when an action could have been brought or damages fully ascertained.

The New York courts emphasize construing and applying the policy language and considering whether false imprisonment, false arrest and malicious prosecution are deemed as “personal injury” or “offense” and whether the injury or the offense is required to happen during the policy period.

The next installment will review the law in California. In the meantime, if there are any questions about another jurisdiction, please contact us and we can address your questions directly.

Oregon Courts Protect Insurers from Attorney’s Fee Awards in Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist Claims in Trio of Recent Cases

The issue of attorney’s fees in cases involving uninsured/underinsured motorist (“UM” or “UIM”) benefits has been a hot topic in Oregon recently, with the Oregon Court of Appeals issuing a decision on this issue once a month for first three months in 2016. In Oregon, an insurer is entitled to a so-called “safe harbor” from the obligation to pay attorney’s fees in UIM cases if “the only issues are the liability of the uninsured or underinsured motorist and the damages due the insured.” ORS 742.061(3). However, if an insurer raises any issues beyond the scope of ORS 742.061(3), the insured is entitled to attorney’s fees.

In January of 2016, the Oregon Court of Appeals addressed what is meant by the phrase “damages due the insured” in ORS 742.061(3). In Spearman v. Progressive Classic Ins. Co., 276 Or. App. 114 (2016), the insured was involved in an accident with an uninsured motorist and sought recovery from his UIM insurer for only “unreimbursed accident-related medical expenses,” i.e. only those expenses for which the insured had not already been reimbursed under other coverage. In its Answer to the Complaint, the insurer admitted that the insured sustained “some” injury in the collision but disputed the “nature and extent” of the insured’s alleged injuries and disputed the “reasonableness and necessity” of some of the insured’s accident-related medical expenses.

The insured argued that he was entitled to attorney’s fees because the phrase “damages due to the insured” meant “the amount of the benefits due the insured,” and a dispute suggesting that the insurer owes no benefit, or that the insured had no unreimbursed accident-related medical expenses, exceeded the scope of the safe harbor in ORS 742.061(3). In other words, the insurer’s challenge to the “reasonableness and necessity” of medical expenses, and the resulting argument that the insured was otherwise fully compensated for his injuries, would allow the fact finder to determine that the insured was not entitled to any award in the UIM action, thereby raising an issue beyond those permitted by ORS 742.061(3).

However, after examining the purpose of UM/UIM benefits and the statutory context of ORS 742.061, the Court of Appeals rejected the insured’s contention and held that the phrase “damages due the insured” refers to what the insured could recover from the uninsured motorist, not from the insurer. Consequently, even though the insurer’s pleadings put at issue the possibility that plaintiff would recover no benefit in the UIM action, such allegations raised issues only as to the damages that the insured would be entitled to recover from the uninsured motorist, as permitted by ORS 742.061(3). As a result, the insured was not entitled to attorney’s fees.

Then, in February of 2016, the Oregon Court of Appeals again held that where an insurer challenged the existence of an insured’s alleged injuries caused by an underinsured motorist, the safe harbor provision applied. Kelley v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 276 Or. App. 553 (2016). The court noted that in Spearman, it had concluded “that the issues that are within the scope of ORS 742.061(3) are the issues of liability and damages that an insured would have to establish in an action against the uninsured or underinsured motorist.” Therefore, the insurer’s denial that the insured injured his shoulder in the collision raised only an issue “of liability and damages that an insured would have to establish in an action against the uninsured or underinsured motorist.” The Court concluded that the insured was within the safe harbor scope of ORS 742.061(3) and the insured was not entitled to attorney’s fees.

Finally, in March of 2016, the Oregon Court of Appeals issued yet another decision favorable to insurers on the safe harbor provision. Robinson v. Tri-County Metropolitan Transportation Dist. of Oregon, 277 Or. App. 60 (2016). In Robinson, the plaintiff suffered injuries as passenger in a Tri-County Metropolitan Transportation District (“Tri-Met”) vehicle when it stopped suddenly to avoid a collision with a “phantom vehicle.” In her subsequent lawsuit, the plaintiff argued that she was entitled to attorney’s fees from Tri-Met, a self-insurer, because Tri-Met asserted affirmative defenses that went beyond the scope of ORS 742.061(3). Specifically, Tri-Met allegedly went beyond the safe harbor provision by (1) asserting the possibility of the insured recovering nothing based on offset; (2) alleging the collateral source offset issue; and (3) alleging the insured had failed to state a claim for Tri-Met’s negligence.

The Court of Appeals rejected the first argument based on Spearman, holding that “[i]n the determination of damages, a zero recovery can be a permissible outcome in a UM/UIM claim as a simple matter of fact or evidence, and, as such, it is a permissible outcome within the bounds of the fee exemption in ORS 742.061(3).”

With respect to the second issue, plaintiff argued that Tri-Met’s allegation of collateral source offset automatically disqualified Tri-Met from the fee exemption. However, the affirmative defense was pled as a matter of course, as a contingency, and there was no actual dispute about the existence, enforceability, or applicability of an offset. By looking to the dictionary definition of the term “issue,” the court noted that “[b]ecause the word is used here in the adversarial context of arbitration or litigation, an ‘issue’ is a matter of live controversy, active contest, or actual dispute.” The Court of Appeals concluded that “an insurer’s boilerplate reference to such a matter is a nonissue.” Because nothing in the record showed that the collateral source allegation was actually developed, disputed, or decided, Tri-Met’s reference to a “nonissue” did not disqualify it from the fee exemption.

The Court of Appeals dispensed with the insured’s third argument by stating that UIM claims turn on the fault of the uninsured driver, not Tri-Met. As a result, any response by Tri-Met regarding the negligence of its driver was a “non sequitur” in a UIM claim.

The Court of Appeals attempted to reconcile the Robinson decision with its prior decision in Kiryuta v. Country Preferred Insurance Co., 273 Or. App. 469 (2015), where the court ruled that the affirmative defenses of “Offset” and “Contractual Compliance” destroyed the insurer’s safe harbor protection. The court explained that in Kiryuta, the insurer accepted coverage in the safe harbor letter but then reserved the prospect to deny coverage by asserting that UIM benefits “are subject to all terms and conditions of the policy of insurance.” The Robinson court observed that the Kiryuta decision “did not consider the question here involving an insurer’s reference to a particular provision, one which did not develop into an actual dispute and especially one that was potentially necessary to calculate sums ultimately payable, such as a policy limit or an offset against damages.” The court so held, despite the fact that the insurer argued that the affirmative defenses were not in dispute, i.e. the affirmative defenses were not intended to assert that some term in the policy prevented plaintiff from recovering any damages and only the damages due to the insured was raised and litigated in the arbitration.

The Kiryuta decision has been accepted for review by the Oregon Supreme Court.